Operation Saturation in Paraisópolis: Policies of Overt State Violence

There has been a little flurry of media attention, and not just in Portuguese language sources, about the Military Police occupation of favela Paraisópolis in recent days. As has been done elsewhere, I’ll give an account of this event. But first I want to put it into a context that clearly identifies this act as an oft-utilized tool of government policy towards favelas, and not just an emergency response to extreme circumstances, as news reports or government accounts would lead you to believe.

In fact, a keyword search of “Operação Saturação” on a news or government portal show scanty coverage of these saturation operations deserving a serious and alarmed discussion. Only some instances of saturation have received significant coverage, which often lacks solid information of the events leading up to its implimentation or the negative ramifications for residents. This only further demonstrates the low priority that media outlets and their audiences place on slum dwellers’ quality of life.

Background

A “Saturation Operation,” or the descent of hundreds of police, vehicles, and arms to first lock down and then monitor an entire community for extended periods of time, has been used in the city of São Paulo a total of 12 times since 2005. It is a deliberate response to spikes of violence that are perceived to threaten neighboring areas or the governability of the favela by state authorities.

In a saturation, hundreds of troops will enter and essentially subdue all activity in the community (over 600 troops in one case) – including legitimate business and school functions, and most car and foot traffic. They embark on an intense investigation of all recent incidences of violence (though rarely their own) and perform detentions, searches (over 50,000 personal searches in one instance), questioning, and sweeps for illegal drugs and arms. Once the community is effectively subdued, they continue to occupy and monitor residents’ coming and going - for up to three months in recent cases. In fact the first use of the saturation tactic, at least under the title of “operation saturation,” was in Paraisópolis. So it seems things have come full circle.

Past saturation operations in São Paulo and their duration include:

Paraisópolis (julho/agosto 2005) – 42 days
Elba/Tamarutaca (agosto/outubro 2005) – 48 days
Pantanal (outubro/dezembro 2005) – 53 days
Guarujá (janeiro 2006) – 25 days
Parque Novo Mundo (fevereiro/abril 2006) – 44 days
Jardim Colombo II/Buraco Quente (maio/julho 2006) – 61 days
Morro do Samba (julho/agosto 2006) – 51 days
Taipas (setembro/novembro 2006) – 72 days
Elisa Maria (março/junho 2007) – 81 days
Alba (setembro/dezembro 2007) – 93 days
Rio Claro (junho/setembro 2008) – 99 days

Starting in 2007 with the occupation of Jardim Elisa Maria, the saturation effort has been followed by a project known as a Virada Social. This omnibus package of social service programs by both state and city agencies often includes dental clinics, construction of a new school or nursery, job skills classes, sporting events, tree planting, community center construction, new public lighting, a family planning course, and the list goes on.

I suspect it simply became politically unfeasible, as these operations became larger, for the government to undertake such drastic repressive measures without some kind of positive social outreach afterward. Or perhaps there is a sense that authorities must clean up after themselves, as in the case of Elisa Maria, where the slaughter of 6 local teens, given at the time as just one instance justifying the initial saturation, later proved to be committed by police.

Operation Saturation in Paraisópolis

We’re now entering the fourth week of the most recent Paraisópolis occupation, a community I visited regularly during my time in São Paulo. It is one of the more economically developed favelas in the city, and boasts some of the best infrastructure I saw in a squatter settlement throughout my time there. It is also the second largest, with around 88,000 residents.

The immediate events leading up to the occupation began on February 1st, when police shot and killed a resident and arrested another. Accounts of this story vary – that the dead man was unarmed, that he was armed and fired on officers, that the surviving man was a relative of a famous imprisoned drug lord, and that he is unrelated. Media reports have neglected any serious investigation into the truth of this first encounter.

In response to this shooting death groups of residents clashed with police on Feb. 2nd– residents barricaded roads, damaged businesses, and burned a handful of cars. Once again, the motives here are unclear. The police allege that the famous drug lord ordered the riot from prison, but again, this has not been confirmed. In the confrontation 4 police and at least two residents were wounded.

In response to this encounter authorities began the Saturation Operation on Feb. 4th that has effectively put the entire community under occupation. 300 Shock Troops and 100 local police patrol the streets and houses, 33 checkpoints operate throughout the community to filter foot traffic and stop suspicious looking persons. There are several reports of officers mistreating and firing upon innocents, detaining and questioning residents an excessive number of times, speaking threateningly to local leaders, and entering houses without residents’ permission. Regardless of whether the rioting was ordered by the imprisoned drug lord or was simply a spontaneous response to police brutality, it is hard to argue that a full-scale occupation of the community for an “unforeseeable amount of time” is justifiable or humane.

Accounts of some resident's complaints have surfaced in major media reports, but the complaints highlighted are either paltry, or when serious, presented as an isolated instance. In fact, serious and widespread complaints exist and were recorded by a group of rights activists in the city whose e-mails I receive. Most residents will not speak to outside reporters. This photo comes from such an e-mail and depicts a man's foot, injured by a police explosive thrown at him while looking for his wife. She is employed at the popular chain homegoods store Casas Bahia, which recently opened in the community, and was working when the police operation began.

Photo taken by Joelma Couto

Details of the Paraisópolis Virada Social are just coming out, but the list is extensive. I would be impressed if all the activities mentioned actually take place, though the large majority of them are short-term, quickie interventions that I cannot see having a lasting impact on the community. Thus far, the saturation and promised social programs have not cooled all tensions, as two journalists who recently entered the favela to record day to day life in the community where temporarily held captive and then driven outside favela borders. Their captors took their recording equipment and instructed the reporters not to come back.


Paraisópolis quick stats

unemployment: 20-25%
illiteracy: 15,000 residents
children who cannot attend school due to lack of spaces in facilities: 5,000
median income: R$367-$614, or 1/4 to 1/2 of the city average

The U.S. squatting movement grows

Squatting in vacant buildings, subsequently known as cortiços in Brazil, is a both a common solution for needy families and a political strategy to press for larger policy changes on housing rights. In recent history, this was largely unheard of in the U.S., which traditionally has stronger laws against such activity and a smaller low income housing deficit than exist in Brazilian cities. But the housing crisis is pushing the needy and their activists into a similar strategy state-side. First in Miami, now Minneapolis, and soon in up to 24 more cities.

The first I heard of this was from a Miami, Florida group called Take Back the Land. They link the housing crisis with the historic struggle of African Americans to access land and property rights:

People of African descent have been systematically denied control of land in their communities- from slavery to sharecropping to segregation to the current gentrification and displacement of our communities…. We assert our right to the land in our community and to use public space for the public good- specifically, to house, feed and provide community space for the poor, particularly in low income black communities. As such, we are Taking Back the Land and empowering the black community, not the politicians, to determine how to use land for the benefit of the community.

- from the TBTL mission statement

Though their philosophy is unique, they share a strategy with the rest of the groups in this post: moving poor families into government- and bank-owned properties. Here is founder Max Rameau on CNN. He makes some excellent points, noting that letting houses sit vacant is not only bad for their now homeless former occupants, but harms the bank's investment (via looting, use as a refuge by drug addicts, and weather damage) as well as the quality of life for surrounding residents:



Just yesterday poverty activists Cheri Honkala and formerly homeless Dwayne Cunningham appeared on Democracy Now! Detailing similar efforts in Minneapolis. There, the Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign recently helped move homeless individuals and families into 13 foreclosed and vacant homes. They are calling for a moratorium on foreclosures, evictions, and short sales in the city. Watch the full story here.

We’re about the business of bringing the neighbors back into the neighborhood, as opposed to throwing them out onto the streets…. We teach people how to reclaim housing as a human right. We’ll teach you how to move into an abandoned government-owned property, to house families. We’ll teach you how to hold a sit-in, to hold a house that’s in the process of foreclosure.

– Cheri Honkala, PPEHRC

In raw numbers, the actions of these two groups only amount to less than 30 occupied homes. But it serves as a significant model that could expand as the crisis deepens, as well as a strong political statement that could ferment action on the part of policymakers to take stronger steps and protect homeowners and homeless families.

Finally, ACORN is now advocating homesteading for foreclosed families – simply refusing to leave your house. They are also recruiting volunteers to join their Home Defenders network. Home Defenders will be trained and then called upon on short notice to help peacefully defend ACORN homesteaders in their city. You can sign up to be on a Home Defender team - cities organizing include Cincinnati and Cleveland, OH. Do it!

Municipal Elections 2: Incomes and Outcomes

In response to my first post on São Paulo’s municipal elections, I got a few questions from a friend about how incomes affected the outcomes. Here are my answers:

Do the non-poor outnumber the poor in SP?

Yes. But by how much is difficult to say. The poverty line in the city is one-half the monthly minimum wage, which is an extremely low figure. Let me illustrate: starting this month, ½ the minimum wage is R$232.50 or about $100 U.S. dollars. Considering that two bus rides per day, M-F, cost R$92 per month alone, this leaves only R$140.50 (U.S. $60) for food, rent, and all other expenses. Riding the bus to work consumes 40% of your income! Also, the city is moving to raise bus and metro fare, so this number could prove even higher in the future.

A better line for poverty in the city would be the full minimum monthly salary, at least. When you consider that a person can qualify for most housing support programs with a family income up to 3 or more minimum salaries, I think one minimum salary as the poverty cut-off is more than reasonable.

Using the low ½ minimum wage line in 2000 (when the last census was taken), 12% of the city’s population was poor, or 1.1 million people. This number reaches 20-38% of the population in the poorest peripheral areas. If you use the full minimum wage as your poverty line, entire sub-municipalities have an average wage that dips within one minimum salary of poverty level. This means that majorities in these electoral districts would live in or near poverty.

This is not to say that the majority of all Paulistanos live in poverty today, but it does mean that a lot more do than official numbers would suggest. For example, a 2003 IBGE study names poverty at 28% versus the 12% census number from 2000.

Remember too that the city also has the highest concentration of rich and super-rich in Brazil, as it is the industrial and financial capital of the country. This group is enormously important for both city and country GDP, and they are very influential.

Was that what gave Kassab the edge and allowed his party to grab five additional City Council seats? [In other words, what effect did income distribution have on municipal elections?]

Yes, this was probably a strong factor. Now there is never a single determining variable in any election, and to prove that income was THE THING or even a BIG THING scientifically would require regression analysis. But from my perspective as an enhanced laywoman, it’s no accident that the districts with money went for Kassab at high margins while Marta only carried the poorest districts. Looking closely reveals two even more interesting questions.

First I'll show the wealth-win correlations - this first graph is some older data (2000 is the most recent census) on income distribution in the city. Now compare this to the graph I posted earlier showing district wins for each candidate. The first is divided by sub-municipal district while the second is by electoral district, but the general correlation is strong and clear. Click on the images to view larger versions.

PER CAPITA INCOME BY SUB-MUNICIPALITY in 2000
source: Atlas de Trabalho e Desenvolvomento de São Paulo

Bounds:
Red = highest income, R$894.77 or more
Light Cream = lowest income, R$275.32 or less



[The upper and lower bounds on this graph hide the extremes of income difference. Monthly incomes in the highest earning districts are actually in the thousands, while the bottom 5th of residents of peripheral districts earn about R$50 per month.]

RESULTS OF THE RUN-OFF
source: Folha de São Paulo

See how most of the red and orange areas in the first graph went for Kassab in the second, while the lighter areas went for Marta?

Not only did Kassab win the richer districts, but he did so at higher margins than Marta was able to carry the poorer ones. For example, Kassab took chic Jardim Paulista (84%), Pinheiros (80%), and Vila Mariana (82%). In all he carried 21 districts by at least 70%, while Marta only carried two. These - Parelheiros (77%) and Grajaú (75%) – are both in the extreme south. The next closest win she claimed was in the public-housing filled Cidade Tiradentes (69%).

Also, the PT lost districts they previously carried in 2004, many in the mid-zones between the poverty of the far periphery and the most concentrated wealth of the center and center-southwest. Examples of this are Capela do Socorro to the south, where Marta won 57%-42% in 2004 but lost 51%-48% in 2008, or Itaquera to the east, where she won won 52%-48% in '04 but lost 58%-42% in '08. Marta increased her support in the last 4 years in only 5 of 57 electoral districts, all of which lie in areas that absorb the city’s highest numbers of poor rural-urban migrants. Four are in the extreme south and one, Brasilândia, is an area to the north where I saw huge expansions of new slum settlement into formerly untouched countryside firsthand.

This begs the questions: why did the PT lose these mid-zones from 2004-2008, and why didn’t the poorer districts back Marta as strongly as the rich ones backed Kassab?

At first I wrote long speculative paragraphs about why this may be: rising incomes over the last 8 years and how these map onto the city today, the rising consumerism and de-politicization of the middle class, increasing concerns over crime, the “pasteurization and professionalization” of social movements, some weaknesses in Marta as a candidate, and the ability of the incumbent Kassab to use city resources to co-opt influential people in poor and transitioning neighborhoods. But reading over them, I don’t have the data to demonstrate national trends in the space of São Paulo, and new census data is still a year away.

Was there a green candidate who siphoned off votes?

Not in the second round, which was the decision-maker. Only Marta and Kassab were left standing for that one.

A squatter's movement in Ohio?

Toledo Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur is telling residents to squat in their own homes and get legal representation if they are being foreclosed upon. The strategy:

(1) Stay in your home. Possession is 9/10ths of the law. And if you live in Wayne County Detroit or Cook County Chicago, the police department will refuse to enforce the foreclosure sale.
(2) Get quality legal representation - Legal Aid and many non-profits offer this at free or reduced charges.
(3) Tell your bank to "Produce the Note." With the rush of sub-prime lending loans and the following rash of bank bailouts and mergers, it's very possible that the party claiming to own your mortgage has no idea where the paperwork is. If they can't prove they hold the deed and show the paper trail, they can't back such a claim in a court of law. At the very least, requiring them to produce the paperwork will slow foreclosure proceedings.