A global phenomenon, and what the hell can we expect democracy to do about it?

This great story in the NYTimes about Gurgaon, India reveals the same phenomena that arise in many "third-world" cities as they become outposts of the global economy. It's similar to São Paulo: severe income inequality made plain through the proximity of slums to luxury high-rises, elites buying exclusive access to public goods of education/health/law and order, and a low state capacity to provide even basic necessities for those not living in these private enclaves.

The story includes quotes from residents of the complex pictured that will surely make your blood boil a bit. There's also an accompanying slide-show to get a better sense of what lives are like on either side of this urban universe. Really, do read the article.

PHOTO: Ruth Fremson, NYTimes

The author only briefly touches on the role democracy plays in this system, noting that:

India has long lived with such inequities, and though a Maoist rebellion is building in the countryside, the nation has for the most part skirted social upheaval through a critical safety valve: giving the poor their chance to vent at the ballot box. Indeed, four years ago, voters threw out the incumbent government, with its “India Shining” slogan, because it was perceived to have neglected the poor.

In democracy, leadership change is always possible and rarely prohibitively difficult. And it is true that the party in power does tweak how a state relates to underclasses (most often this shows in levels of social spending). But if India is anything like Brazil, I would venture to guess that voting and other democratic institutions have not fundamentally altered the nature of urban inequality, nor the basic relationship between the poor and the state. When I feel pessimistic, I doubt whether they ever will.

The field of comparative politics gives certain reasons for why democracies in practice are limited in this respect: clientelism and cronyism, corruption, manipulation of the press, fractured party systems and other institutional weaknesses, etc. If we can break these patterns and strengthen institutions, democracy will "function better." (As an aside, what constitutes "better functioning" is ultimately a normative question, making comparativists pretty useless for defining it in any compelling way. But for me, better functioning means creating conditions of social justice.)

The technocratic cartwheels of comparative politics aside, they are basically using what I call the "more cowbell" argument. (Recall the classic SNL skit with Christopher Walken exclaiming "I've got a fever, and the only prescription is more cowbell!") If something isn't working - in this case democracy - we just need more of it.

But what if all the noise from the cowbell is covering up an inherently bad tune? Political theorists in the line of Marx will tell you that capitalism is to blame, to which democracy is inherently secondary - nothing more than a distraction from the economic gluttony and exploitation at work, a way to pacify the oppressed by giving them a superficial outlet for their anger. As an OSU professor has noted, democracy is unlike any other political system in that it internalizes descent. And in my thinking, it is in fact anti-revolutionary - to the degree that it keeps all sides playing under the established rules of the game and feeding the underdogs small victories as needed - just enough to keep them in for the next round.

Still, I'm not convinced this is inherently so. I don't really have any answers here. There was a time when I believed wholeheartedly in democracy's ability to facilitate fundamental changes, perhaps radical. I am much more pessimistic now, but where has that gotten me? I still can't untangle the knotted roots of urban injustice enough to say with conviction what they are, how they work, or most importantly, where to start pulling them up.